A real peace, thank God, is at last absorbing millions of minds at the present moment. The sincerity of this wish cannot be doubted. Every nation has good cause to ponder over her sacrifices, however glorious, in the cause of patriotism. Every eye is turned on Paris. In the foreground is the idea of the League of Nations, which was already recommended at the Hague Conference by the Emperor Nicholas II. in 1898. The analogy is remarkable. When Germany pretends that she did not desire war, but that it was Russia’s fault, it would only be natural and wise to record certain recent facts contained in the Hague Peace Conference. The shipwrecking of that scheme was entirely due to Germany. When this scheme began to be thoroughly discussed, and to an extent accepted by the other Powers, bon gré mal gré, it was Germany who opposed it and thus broke up the Conference. She said that “she feared popular excitement and an outbreak of chauvinistic passions.” Could anything be more absurd? In reality she feared only the shipwrecking of her own schemes for world conquest, as revealed by her tremendous and obstinate preparations for the decisive date. Her categorical opposition at that juncture is an eloquent testimony of her nefarious designs. How could this opposition fail to strike the thinking world? The initiative of the Tsar was made public to the world through the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Mouravieff, on August 24, 1898; and here is that noble document, which seems to me already forgotten, as I never see it quoted anywhere:¹

“The maintenance of general peace and possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations present themselves in the existing condition of the whole world as the ideal towards which the endeavours of all Governments should be directed.

“The humanitarian and magnanimous ideas of His Majesty the Emperor have been won over to this view. In the conviction that this lofty aim is in conformity with the most essential interests and the legitimate views of all Powers, the Imperial Government thinks that the present moment would be very favourable to seeking, by means of international discussion, the most effectual means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and durable peace, and, above all, of putting an end to the progressive development of the present armaments.

“In the course of the last twenty years the longings for a general appeasement have grown especially pronounced in the consciences of civilized nations. The preservation of peace was put forward as the object of international policy; it is in its name that great States have concluded between themselves powerful alliances; it is the better to guarantee peace that they have developed in proportions, hitherto unprecedented, their military forces, and still continue to increase them without shirking any sacrifice.

“All these efforts, nevertheless, have not yet been able to bring about the beneficial results of the desire for pacification. The financial charges following an upward march strike at the public prosperity at its very source.

“The intellectual and physical strength of the nations, labour and capital, are for the major part diverted from their natural application, and unproductively consumed. Hundreds of millions are devoted to acquiring terrible engines of destruction, which, though regarded as the last word of science, are destined to-morrow to lose all value in consequence of some fresh discovery in the same field.

“National culture, economic progress, and the production of wealth, are either paralyzed or checked in their development. Moreover, in proportion as the armaments of each Power increase, so do they less and less fulfil the object which the Governments have set before themselves.

“The economic crisis, due in great part to the system of armaments à outrance, and the continual danger which lies in this massing of war material, are transforming the armed peace of our days into a crushing burden, which the peoples have more and more difficulty in bearing. It appears evident, then, that if this state of things were prolonged it would inevitably lead to the very cataclysm which it is desired to avert, and the horrors of which make every thinking man shudder in advance.

“To put an end to those incessant armaments, and to seek the means of warding off the calamities which are threatening the whole world, such is the supreme duty which is to-day imposed on all States.

“Filled with this idea, His Majesty has been pleased to order me to propose to all the Governments whose representatives are credited to the Imperial Court the meeting of a Conference which would have to occupy itself with this great problem.

“This Conference would be, by the help of God, a happy presage for the century which is about to open. It would converge in one powerful focus the efforts of all the States which are sincere—seeking to make the great conception of universal peace triumph over the elements of trouble and discord.”

(The importance of the word “sincere” on such an occasion is particularly precious.)

“It would, at the same time, cement their agreement by a corporate consecration of the principles of equity and right on which rest the security of States and the welfare of peoples.”

Had anybody at that time known the extent of Germany’s secret preparations, her attitude towards Nicholas II.’s rescript would have occasioned no surprise. But the Kaiser no doubt possessed the power or the talent to act different parts concurrently, and experienced diplomatists, it seems, were misled entirely by his pacific assurances; in fact, there were many statesmen who trusted his word.

On the other hand, as a practical demonstration of the Russian Emperor’s peaceful schemes, General Kuropatkin, the Minister for War, in the same year proposed to Count Witte that Russia, instead of spending millions on artillery, should enter into an agreement with Austria binding both Powers not to change their old guns—i.e., not to construct new ones. Count Witte, mindful of his emperor’s peaceful inclinations, although he rejected the limited proposal, substituted for it an alternative—the proposal that the European Powers should endeavour to arrive at a general agreement to content themselves with purely nominal armaments and fleets solely for the purpose of defence. By this means Europe might vie with the United States in prosperity. Militarism—voilà l’ennemi. These words, impossible for a German to utter, were quite natural in those who worked for the Hague Conference. Truth compels me to admit that some Russian statesmen foresaw the difficulty in trying to find general support for this proposal, but in important critical moments the Emperor Nicholas II. never hesitated to take extremely courageous measures, disregarding his Ministers’ warnings in many important instances, as these chapters will prove. The curious part in the matter is that the Kaiser, concealing his real aims and energetic but mysterious work, had raised the subject in 1893. One cannot help remembering Talleyrand’s too often accepted declaration, “La parole est donnée pour cacher la vérité.”

Two years earlier, Lord Salisbury had suggested to the Kaiser that, in view of the fact that in the six years ending 1888 seven European Powers had had to raise close upon a thousand million pounds sterling for naval and military expenditure, it would be well if something could be done to abate the plague. The Kaiser pretended to be taken with the idea, and contemplated calling a European Congress to consider practical measures for securing universal peace.

The subject was discussed in the German press, but the French, quick to perceive the deception, showed hostility, and the subject was dropped. In this connection I am glad to recall the intimacy which sprang up between Count Ignatieff and the Marquis of Salisbury at Constantinople in their discussion. It was, however, still present to the Kaiser’s mind, and when he visited Rome in 1893 he spoke on the subject to the Pope. According to a letter written by M. Crispi on July 6, 1893, published by the Deutsche Revue of September, 1907, the Kaiser, at his famous interview with Leo XIII., at the Vatican, April 23, 1893, proposed to the Pope that a European Congress should be summoned to discuss the question of disarmament. The Pope, remarked M. Crispi, with malice “approved the idea, not because he believed anything could be done, but because the question of disarmament might lead to an international conflict, from which he might profit.”

“The truth was that the Kaiser had had his thoughts turned to international disarmament by the disconcerting refusal of the Reichstag to add 83,894 more men to the German Army. A fortnight after the conversation in the Vatican the Reichstag was dissolved, and no more was heard of the proposed conference.”²

Here we have another and, I believe, scarcely recorded proof of the Kaiser’s double-dealing.

On the other hand a striking proof of the Tsar Nicholas II.’s unswerving efforts to secure international disarmament is furnished by the events of 1908. At that time Sir Edward Grey was insisting very strongly upon the absolute necessity of raising the question of armaments at the Hague. Here again the stumbling-block was Berlin, and we may add for the same cause as before. The German Government, only after continued representations had been made, consented to the question of armaments being debated at the Conference, but carefully reserved to itself the right to abstain from the discussion. Quite different was the attitude of the Tsar. It must be remembered that this was the worst possible moment for Russia to disarm. She had just suffered cruel losses in the Japanese War, which her very safety demanded to have restored, and I may here add that German diplomatists were ordered to admire our Eastern adventures, whilst even Russians openly attacked this policy. Yet she vehemently adhered to the discussion of the proposal. Unfortunately, while Russia was at pains to prove and honestly apply her peaceful theories, Germany, as her antitheses, was practising her warlike weapons, and pushed Austria to set fire to the train which was leading straight to a European War. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, two orthodox Slav provinces, was a challenge to Russia’s pride and her honour. The whole of Russia was restrained in her indignation only by the will of the autocratic Emperor. But when Austria suddenly proceeded to threaten Serbia with annihilation and dared to give Russia only forty-eight hours for a reply, the cup had been filled to overflowing. As a devoted son unhesitatingly defends the honour of his mother, the Tsar defended the honour of Russia, forgetting the difficulties of the task.

Some saw in the Tsar a dreamer. Yes, he dreamt; and his motto might have been, “I dream, I persevere, and I realize.”

OLGA NOVIKOFF.

1. See “M.P. for Russia,” pp. 402.405.
2. See “M.P. for Russia,” pp. 264.