What are you to do with your old friend and ally at Constantinople? You have talked a good deal. Are you going to act? And if so, how, and when, and where?

That is what we want to know in Russia, and so far we have not been able to gratify our curiosity on these points.

It is nonsense to say that you want to know what Russia intends to do. It is your move. When you have moved, we will follow suit. But we will not interfere with your play.

And the worst of it is, it seems to many of us to be only play. All these big, swelling words, these resounding speeches, which lead to nothing, are too much like the Chinese painted dragons with which—well, with which they did not beat the Japanese. Neither will you coerce the Turk with dispatches. If you mean to do anything, you must show it by deeds, not by mere words. Again I ask: What are you going to do?

I said it was your move. May I remind you why it is for you to take the first step in the matter? Because when Russia, seventeen years ago, foresaw all this, and proposed to take effective guarantees for the prevention of all these horrors, all these atrocities, all these massacres, it was England, yes, and the present Prime Minister of England, who thwarted us, who led the opposition to our proposal, and who succeeded in defeating us in the Congress of Berlin. I am not here referring to the destruction of the Treaty of San Stefano and the substitution of a European for a Russian guarantee for the protection of the unfortunate Armenians. That is an old story, and one to which I need not refer just now. I am alluding to facts which most Englishmen seem to have forgotten, but which Russians can never forget—facts which, with your permission, I will recall to the recollection of your readers.

When the Congress of Berlin had almost completed its labours a last despairing effort was made by the plenipotentiaries of Russia to secure some effective guarantee for the execution of its provisions. Russia, of course, was able to guarantee the due execution of the Treaty in such regions as she occupied, and so long as she was in occupation; but after the evacuation, who was to see to it that the Turks carried out their obligations? Europe having rejected the exclusive Russian guarantee of the San Stefano Treaty, was morally bound to replace it by a European guarantee that would be not less binding. Recognising loyally the decision of Europe, our plenipotentiaries brought forward a clause which if it had been accepted would have enabled Europe to have prevented the abuses which have filled Armenia with bloodshed.

At the sitting of the Соngress held July 8, 1878, Prince Gortchakoff read a formal communication, in which, with the pre-science born of long and painful experience, he asked assembled Europe “by what principles and in what manner it proposes to ensure the execution of its high decisions.” “Russia,” he said, “has at any rate the right to expect that her sacrifices should not be rendered useless through the non-execution of the provisions of the Treaty.” Being requested to define more precisely what Russia desired, Prince Gortchakoff two days later brought in the following draft, which he proposed should be added to the Treaty:—

“Europe, having given her most solemn and binding sanction to the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, the high contracting parties regard the totality of the articles of the present Act as forming a combination of stipulations, the execution of which they engage to control and superintend, while insisting on their being carried out entirely in conformity with their intentions.

“They reserve to themselves the right to come to an understanding, in case of need, as to the requisite means to ensure a result which neither the general interests of Europe nor the dignity of the Great Powers permit them to leave unsolved.”

This was clear. If it had been accepted it would have given the Powers an explicit mandate to enforce the provisions of the Treaty against the Turk. It anticipated greatly in advance the precise situation that has arisen, and proposed to meet it by a solid united European guarantee. That was Russia’s move. But Russia was check-mated. And by whom? By England, and by England represented by Lord Salisbury. If you turn to the protocols of the Berlin Congress, with which I have just been refreshing my memory and soothing my patriotic amour propre, you will find that Lord Salisbury took the lead in opposing any such guarantee. He asked immediately if the proposition did not imply the necessity of employing a foreign force in case the Treaty be not carried into effect, and then declared he should regret to see any such declaration inserted in the Treaty. The need for it was very plainly stated by Count Schouvaloff. He referred to the articles of the treaty of 1856 stipulating for the amelioration of the condition of the Christian populations, which were not put into execution. “In consequence of this there arose for Europe frequent commotions, wars, and at length the meeting of Congress. It would be necessary not to find themselves for a second time in presence of like difficulties.”

This could well be done by the Powers agreeing to give a solemn and obligatory sanction to the stipulations of the Treaty, and he urged them to do so.

Who refused?

Lord Salisbury! And why?

I will quote his own words:—

“I cannot comprehend the object of the Russian proposal. I know of no sanction more solemn and more binding than the signature of my Government.”

The Turkish plenipotentiary was more frank. He supported Lord Salisbury’s objection, not because he could not comprehend it, but because he comprehended it too well. “The Russian proposal.” he said, “imposed on all the contracting parties the mutual duty of controlling the stipulations of the Treaty. The Porte would thus find itself obliged to admit within its own limits the control of other States.”

Precisely! That was why we proposed it. That is why England rejected it, and that is exactly what England is crying for today as the only hope for the pacific solution of the Armenian crisis!

Russia made her move plainly and above board. Count Schouvaloff said that the rights of the Powers to watch and control the execution of the provisions of the Treaty being clearly established, he did not see why things should not be called by their names, and why the control and superintendence which they demanded should be refused. England, confronted with this frank demand to put the Turk under tutelage, rejected it with scorn. The Russian proposal thereupon was defeated, Lord Salisbury carrying with him the plenipotentiaries of France. Italy, and Turkey. Russia, having only the support of Germany and Austria, was in a minority of one—that one being Turkey herself! Can you wonder, then, if, under these circumstances, Russia waits to see what England is going to do? You thwarted us and rendered abortive the measures which we told you were indispensable. Now you find you were wrong and that we were right, what are you going to do to put it right? You cannot at this time of day throw upon us the burden at undoing the mischief you did in 1878.

The case is even worse than this. Lord Salisbury sinned with his eyes open. When the clause about the Armenians was under discussion Lord Salisbury—of all men—actually proposed that the Congress should take guarantees for the execution of the reforms that were demanded. At the sitting of July 6, 1878, when the Congress was busy discussing the Armenian clause, Lord Salisbury proposed to add the words:—“Turkey will come to an ulterior agreement with the six signatory Powers as to the scope of this engagement and the measures necessary to put it into execution.” His Excellency added—continued the Protocol, in unconscious irony—“that the interests of the Armenians ought to be secured, and that the object of the proposal is to hold out to them hopes of immediate amelioration simultaneously with future progress.”

“Immediate amelioration”! Seventeen years have passed, and the only realisation of these hopes is to be seen in the slaughter-pits of Sassoun and the reign of terror in Armenia. But this clause, proposed by Lord Salisbury, was not accepted. The Turke objected because the proposal seemed to refer to ulterior measures. Russia supported Lord Salisbury. But Lord Salisbury ran away from his own proposal, and the present ineffective clause was all that Armenia received.

Now I hope I have made it clear why it is Russia will take no initiative in this matter. It is your move, not ours. We wait to see whether at the eleventh hour you will endeavour, seventeen years too late, to make some amends for the crime of Berlin.