What is the Traditional Policy of Russia?

The Traditional Policy of Russia is an alliance with England!

Long before Russia bowed beneath the Tartar yoke, our reigning Prince, Vladimir Monomachus, married Gyda, daughter of your noble Harold, who fell on the fatal field of Senlac.

The Tartar invasion, lasting nearly three centuries, did not favour communications, much less an alliance between Russia and England.

But after we got rid of the Tartars, Ivan the Fourth, graphically surnamed the Terrible, sent an Embassy to your Queen Elizabeth to negotiate a close alliance with England, and according to several historians, he was even anxious to marry her. Your Queen, however, preferring “single blessedness” refused, and the death of Ivan IV. brought the negotiations to an end.

Since then matrimonial ties, were not spoken of for nearly three hundred years, but many efforts have been made by us to establish a cordial understanding, by other means, between the two nations.

Our efforts, however, have too often been paralysed by lying legends and calumnies invented by our enemies to prejudice the ignorant against us. One of these—perhaps the most famous—the spurious Will of Peter the Great, written nearly a hundred years after Peter’s death by the ingenious Frenchman, Le Sur, is frequently appealed to, as the most convincing proof of Russia’s wickedness, nevertheless, forgery though it is, it contains one point which was well adapted to Russian views, viz., the Seventh Article, which is as follows.

“Seek the alliance of England on account of our commerce, as being the country most useful to us for the developement of our navy and mercantile marine, and for the exchange of our produce against her gold.”

Russian Emperors have always been of the opinion that Russia and England are natural allies, even although circumstances have occasionally thrown them into temporary antagonism to a mistaken English policy.

Up to the very outbreak of the Crimean War, our Emperor Nicholas was most sincerely anxious to be “upon terms of closest amity with England.”

In his famous conversations with Sir Hamilton Seymour, that anxious desire was most manifest.¹

As to the attitude of Russia before the late war, even our most exacting critics admit that our Emperor could not possibly have done more than he did to secure the alliance and the co-operation of England. The Livadia despatch was but the culmination of a long series of similar overtures for English friendship—overtures which, I regret to say, met with but cool and scanty responses from your Government.

In making these advances, our Government was only carrying out the ancient, the traditional policy of Russia. The change has been with you, not with us.

During the eighteenth century, the two Powers were frequently in alliance both in peace and in war. On one occasion Russian soldiers garrisoned the Channel Islands. On another, Russian fleets were refitted in English dockyards. English admirals often commanded Russian navies, while Russian and English soldiers, as faithful allies, fought side by side on many a hard contested field.

The great statesmen of both countries recognized the importance of the Anglo-Russian Alliance. Our Minister, M. Panin, in 1766, informed the envoy of your Earl of Chatham, that he entertained “the strongest desire of entering into the strictest engagements, and the most intimate friendship with England, being convinced that my policy could neither be solid nor perfect unless Great Britain were a party to it.” It was the repeatedly declared conviction of Prince Potemkin that the union of Russia and England was absolutely essential to the peace of the East.

That conviction has been strengthened, rather than weakened by the history of the last hundred years.

The most illustrious English statesmen concurred with Prince Potemkin and M. Panin, in the value they placed upon the alliance between the two countries. Chatham was not ashamed to declare that “he was altogether a Russian.” Fox, Burke, even Pitt, as well as Canning and others nearer our time have either concluded treaties of friendship with Russia, or expressed themselves as most favourable to the Russian alliance.

It is not a century since it was the custom to refer to Russia in Parliament as “the natural, ancient, and traditional ally of England.”

In the great crisis of European history, England and Russia were the foremost opponents of the Emperor Napoleon, and it was to their joint endeavours that Europe owed the overthrow of the ascendancy of France.

You have now occupied Cyprus as “a strong place of arms” to menace Russia, but your previous Mediterranean occupation—that of the Ionian islands—was undertaken at the suggestion of your Russian ally. Nor did you always dread Russia as a Mediterranean power, for England has insisted upon our fleet entering that sea, and once negotiations were even begun to cede us a naval station at Minorca.

Is it not a remarkable proof of the utility of the Russian alliance that on two occasions, when the English Government so far forgot its true interests as to threaten to make war upon Russia, the war should have been prevented by the vigorous protests of the English people?²

The instinct of the nation was wiser than the statecraft of its rulers, and the English succeeded on both occasions in doing that all but impossible thing—even in Constitutional countries—of restraining a Prime Minister who was bent on going to war.

We are not ungrateful for the generous sympathies and natural friendliness of the English people.

We only regret that in two important crisises of your history, your Constitutional Government so misrepresented your real feelings as to render it necessary to prevent war, to overrule your Ministry by an almost revolutionary agitation.

When Empress Catherine II. heard of the services which Mr. Fox had rendered to the cause of humanity in restraining Mr. Pitt from making war upon Russia about Oczakoff, she placed his bust between those of Cicero and Demosthenes, exclaiming, “Il a délivré par son éloquence la patrie et la Russie d’ une guerre pour la quelle il n’y avait ni justice ni raisons.”

Mr. Fox, in his place in Parliament expressed himself highly gratified by the distinction conferred upon him by the Empress, and made the memorable declaration—“With regard to Russia, it has ever been my opinion that she was the power in Europe with whom the cultivation of reciprocal ties of friendship, both commercial and political, was most natural and of the greatest consequence to this country.”

Now, if Russians venture to express their gratitude to an English statesman, whose eloquence like that of Mr. Fox, has indeed delivered both countries from a senseless war, he is decried as a “Russian agent” and a traitor to his country. The change is not exactly an improvement, nor is it calculated to strengthen good feeling on either side.

Englishmen may yet discover that these prejudices against us are detrimental to their interests. Seventy years ago, an English author declared that “Russia, the most powerful, the most natural, the most useful of our allies, has so intimate a connection of interests with us that the soundest policy must dictate to us a union of design and co-operation in action.”³ If that were true then, how much more so must it be now, for since then we have divided Asia between us?

Even Lord Palmerston, when the Crimean War was still an affair of yesterday, declared to our ambassador, Count Chreptovitch, that “Russia and England had great interests in common, and that as long as they did not come into collision about Turkey or Persia there was no reason why they should not act in concert on many important matters.”

To Russians, it seems that the danger of a collision about the affairs of these countries is the greatest of reasons why the two Powers should act in concert.

Russia has always particularly sought for concert with England in dealing with Turkey.

Much as the Russian Government desired the English alliance which Lord Chatham pressed upon us, it was refused unless England would act in concert with us in Turkish affairs.

That principle, rejected by Chatham, was accepted by Pitt in 1795.

Only four years after he had been threatening us with war, a treaty was concluded which conceded that principle of common action in the Levant, for which Russia had never ceased to contend.

Is not that fact a happy augury for the future? Four years after the War Vote of 1791, the two Powers entered into a close alliance. Who knows but the same thing may happen within four years of the War Vote of 1878?

Even during this century, Russia and England have oftener been friends than foes. In the Napoleonic wars, the English fleet menaced Constantinople because the Turks had declared war against Russia. It was not in Russia that the battle of Navarino was condemned as “an untoward event,” and only last year in spite of the bitterness occasioned by the war we celebrated its jubilee with enthusiasm.

As we fought together against the Turks, so we have also, I regret to say, been allied in support of the Sultan. When Mehemet Ali threatened to overturn the Ottoman Empire, Russian troops occupied Constantinople, while an English fleet cruised off the coast of Syria.

The Crimean war was indeed “an untoward event,” but the despatches of Lord John Russell, before war broke out, bore repeated testimony to the earnestness and sincerity with which our Emperor laboured to establish a good understanding and concerted action with England in the affairs of Turkey.

Since the Peace of Paris in 1856, Russia has never been at war with England, while she has frequently energetically seconded English policy.

At the Conference of Constantinople, General Ignatieff abandoned his own scheme of reforms in order to give a more effectual support to that of Lord Salisbury, and after the Conference failed, Russia exhausted every diplomatic expedient to preserve the concert with England, before she drew the sword.

Not until it was seen that the only concert with England was concert in inaction, with all wrongs unredressed, and all the Slavs left in slavery, did Russia act alone.

But even when compelled unassisted to do single-handed the duty of all Europe, Russia displayed the most scrupulous regard for “British Interests.” Ascertaining them from Lord Derby at the beginning of the war, Russia brought the contest to a triumphant close without threatening a single point specified by your Foreign Minister.

We sent you our terms of peace before we crossed the Danube, and we sent you the Treaty of San Stefano, as soon as it reached St. Petersburg.

At the Berlin Congress we gave way repeatedly to satisfy your demands, and surrendered all exclusive privileges in order to act in concert with Europe.

How England rewarded this, I need not say. But unless we surrendered the Christians of the East to the vengeance of the Turk, we could do no more. In fact, truly speaking, we even went too far. The aspirations, the ardent wishes of the Russian people have been sacrificed for your friendship. One step more would be almost treason to our brethren, a betrayal of our duty. Such a price could not be paid—no!—not even for the purchase of the English alliance.

If England, if the English people identify their interests with the maintenance of Turkish power over all the peoples South of the Balkans, then I reluctantly admit that any alliance between us is impossible. As has frequently been said, “at any cost,without even counting the cost,” Russia must do her duty. For us, there is no choice possible between the Slavs and their oppressors. Some of our officials, estranged from their own nation by their false education, dislike the very name of Slavs, but as long as there is the slightest link between them and the Russian people, even they would not dare so far to forget their duty as to sanction an alliance on such terms.

Russians know well that nothing grand can be obtained without sacrifices. If new sacrifices are needed, what does it prove? Only that we have not done enough. No power on earth can stop the natural development of events. The future of the Slavonic world is as clear to us as the path of honour which we have to follow.

But are we to believe that the English people after all their protestations of sympathy with the Eastern Christians will insist upon such a shameful price for their alliance, as a support of the Turkish power?

It is impossible!

I look forward confidently to the conclusion of a good understanding between Russia and England, based upon the peaceful but effective elimination of Turkish authority from Europe.

Only on that basis is real alliance possible. The Sick Man has hardly even strength enough to die. You cannot keep him alive. Why should we not decide what must be put in his place?

And so with the further East. Co-partners in the work of civilizing Asia, our entente cordiale is the key to the peace of the Continent.

Destroy it, and from Constantinople to Japan there will be ceaseless intrigues, insurrections, and war.

Mr. J. Anthony Fronde, whose courageous advocacy of an Anglo-Russia Alliance dates back to the dark times of the Crimean War expressed this truth very clearly when he wrote in his admirable “Short studies on Great Subjects?” “We may be sure that if it was understood in the East, that Russia and England, instead of enemies were cordial friends, that they recognised each other’s position and would assist each other in difficulties, the imagination of resistance would be quenched in the certainty of its hopelessness.”

It is not sufficient that we should not be at open war, to secure peace in Asia. We must be staunch friends and act in cordial concert within our respective spheres. The Oriental world is convulsed with war when Russia and England are in opposition. Cross purposes between St. Petersburgh and London may be confined to despatches in Europe, but they result in crossed swords in Persia and Affghanistan.

The only hope of barbarism in Asia lies in discord between the two civilizing Empires. If we are united, civilization is safe, but a policy of antagonism, even although we do not draw the sword, may end in restoring Asia to the Asiatics.

Believe me, it is not Russia who will suffer most by the persistence in this policy of hostility and suspicion. Our stake in Asia is trivial compared with yours. Turkestan entails a costly drain upon our exchequer nor can we import Turkomans to make war in Europe. With you in India it is different. We do not want India. We could not take India if we did want it. But when the visit of a single Russian envoy to Cabul induces you to undertake a costly, useless war, what hope is there of peaceful progress, and the development of civilization in the East, if the two Powers are to be permanently estranged?

Lord Napier and Ettrick, who, after he had left his ambassador’s post at St. Petersburgh, was considered in this country, as well as in Russia, as a decided Russophobist, referring on the 9th December, in his speech in Parliament, to the Russian mission to Cabul, frankly said,—“When we looked at the relations which existed between this country and Russia before July, he did not think we could quarrel with Russia for taking the course she did.”

This however is so evident, that one is surprised how people could ever fail to see it. But Lord Napier grasps the question even more vigorously, and proves that he has not altogether forgotten the real character of Russia. Here are his words:—“Russia had moved forward in the direction of national sympathies and asperations of the people, and with consummate prudence. With a country so constituted, it was necessary to employ judicious means for seeming amity, if not absolute alliance, and the best means the Government could employ was an absolute plainness and frankness, so that Russia should not be in any doubt as to the course we should pursue with reference to Affghanistan. He thought that after the termination of the war there should be a definite treaty between England and Russia, as it would be likely to have a tranquillising effect upon India.”

Our interests are identical, our mission is the same; why then can we not revert to the traditional policy of Russia and become once more firm allies and good friends?

It is not only in Asia that the two nations stand side by side. In Europe we occupy similar ground in resisting the authority of Papal Rome, each in our own way, we both protest against the corruptions and abuses of the Vaticanate Church.

Thus presenting a common front alike against the Mohammedan barbarism of Asia, and the spiritual despotism of Europe, is it not time that we should frankly recognise the similarity of our mission and loyally support each other in the face of the common foe?

“The Russians,” says Mr. Froude, “though our rivals in the East, had in Europe till the outbreak of the Crimean War been our surest allies.” Even since then, English Cabinets have had no reason to regret the existence of Russia in Europe. It is not so many years ago, that Lord Beaconsfield’s Government allied itself with the Russian Empire to prevent a renewal of the Franco-German war, and I believe it was Lord Beaconsfield who pointed eight years ago to a Anglo-Russian alliance as a means of preventing Napoleon’s March “a Berlin,” which terminated so disastrously at Sedan.

We are also united in the great humanitarian crusade against slavery and the slave trade.

You look back with pride to the abolition of slavery in your colonies, we glory in the emancipation of our serfs—that measure which for ever secured our gratitude to Emperor Alexander who understood and supported the best aspirations of his people.

It is your proud boast that slaves cannot breathe upon English soil. It is not less true of Russia, who for the last hundred years has waged unceasing war against the slave trade, both in Europe and in Asia. It was our conquest of the Crimea which suppressed the market in which Polish and Russian captives were sold like cattle by the Mussulman, and the first fruits of our entry into Khiva was the release of all the slaves in the Khanate.

But why enter into details? Whether it is in the field of exploration, or in the domain of science, or in any other of the numberless departments of our complex civilization you will find that Russians are fellow-workers with you, neither unfriendly nor unworthy.

Why then should you persist in regarding us as worse than declared enemies?—A very intelligent friend of mine, who has enjoyed unusual opportunities of studying Russian and English policy writes to me:—

“The popular clamour against Russia in England is not only unjust, but childish, and contemptible, and defeats its own purpose. To tell you the truth I sometimes blush for the half childish, half brutal national egotism of a great part of my countrymen. If we have to fight, let us do so and be done with it, respecting each other as honourable opponents, but (like yourself) I do not see the least necessity for fighting. It would be folly in England to go to war to put on his legs the incurably Sick Man, and it would be equally foolish of Russia to go to war in order to accelerate by a few years the inevitable death of the patient? How many difficulties might be removed by a genuine understanding between Russia and England.”

Why should there not be such an understanding between us?

Surely it has been sufficiently proved that we could do each other a great deal of harm, although not without injuring many a noble cause, which we ought to serve if we really care for Humanity and Civilization.

It is for you—not for us—now to decide whether we are to be Friends or Foes!

O.K.

1. “You know my opinions with regard to England. Were we agreed, I am quite without anxiety as to the West of Europe; it is immaterial what the others may think or do.” Again in January, 1853, alluding to the probable fall of Turkey, “It is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs, and that neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not apprized.”
2. 1791 and 1876.
3. 1791 and 1876.